secret police. 'Correspondents here feel quite literally as though they were living in a powder-house which may explode at any moment,' he concluded his letter. 2 Salisbury's two assignments in Russia gave him a good vantage point on the changes in Soviet attitudes toward American journalists after the Second World War. As two increasingly hostile camps replaced the wartime alliances, Soviet leaders came to view American journalists as spearheads of enemy propaganda and the weapons of U.S. imperialism. Soviet authorities erected institutional barriers to international reporting and subjected American correspondents in Moscow to censorship, surveillance, travel restrictions, and expulsions. Mass media and popular cultural products, such as theatre and film, were mobilised to discredit the reporting of American correspondents. Aggravated by such treatment, Salisbury and his colleagues wrote extensively about the difficulties of foreign correspondents in the Soviet Union. By the late 1940s, pundits and readers in the U.S. came to identify Soviet censorship and maltreatment of American journalists as one of the defining traits of an oppressive Communist dictatorship.
It is less known that the correspondents for the Soviet news agency TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) in the United States also felt the repercussions of the deteriorating relationship between the two superpowers.
Shortly after the war, American officials and pundits began to argue that TASS correspondents gathered intelligence rather than news and therefore endangered national security. American efforts to curb TASS developed on several parallel fronts and often involved grassroots initiatives that united journalists, government agencies, businessmen, and anti-Communist zealots. The people who became involved in the anti-TASS campaign, however, did not consider their efforts as regulation of the foreign news media. The campaign attacked the premises of Soviet state-controlled reporting and questioned whether Soviet correspondents in the U.S. should be considered journalists. The resultant atmosphere of suspicion and hostility toward TASS had a long-lasting impact on the agency's work in the United States.
This article introduces a comparative framework to the study of Cold War journalism. Building on contemporary publications and archival sources from Russia and the United States, it examines the Soviet campaigns against American correspondents and American crusades against TASS. A comparative approach reveals that targeting of rivals' journalists was not an idiosyncratic feature of the Soviet political system, but a practice that transcended the Cold War divide. Mutual hostility led both superpowers to abandon their wartime agreements for information exchange and journalistic collaboration. The Cold War imagination transformed these foreign correspondents from symbols of wartime alliance into dangerous subversives. A comparative approach demonstrates that Soviet and American campaigns against the enemy's correspondents were deeply embedded in their respective, socialist or liberal, approaches to journalism, news-making, and press-government relationship. These different ideological injunctions underlined the dynamics of each campaign, determined the mechanisms that were available to the participants, and informed each side's responses to the attacks on its Introduction (London: Verso, 1991), 6-7. 4 Eddy Gilmore to Alan J. Gould, Assistant General Manager of the Associated Press, 10 November 1945. AP 2.1, The General Files: Foreign Bureau Files, The Archives of The Associated Press.
(Hereafter APA). 5 Molotov made an unexpected move. The Minister asked Gilmore what he would say if the Soviet censorship of foreign correspondents in Moscow were to be abolished. Staggering and wondering if he had heard correctly, Gilmore answered that the removal of censorship would be a fine thing. Molotov then proposed a toast 'for better understanding of one another,' a toast that Gilmore insisted to drink in vodka, to show his respect for the Russian minister. When Molotov moved on to his next drinking fellow, U.S. Ambassador Harriman pulled Gilmore aside and said that he believed that the minister just indicated that censorship would be lifted. The following days showed that Molotov's promise was sincere. 'Not a word has been taken out of any story of mine and they've been passing political commentary without going through their always-up-to-now horrible process of referring us upstairs to Vyshinskii and Molotov,' wrote Gilmore several days after the banquet. 5 The idyll was short-lived. One month later, in December 1945, foreign journalists became a source of a small scandal in the Soviet Politburo. While vacationing in Sochi, Stalin opened the most recent dossier on foreign press coverage of the Soviet Union and came upon two 'slanderous dispatches' authored by the Moscow correspondents of the New York Times and the Daily Herald. 6 The first item proposed that the members of the Politburo disagreed in their assessment of the London Conference of Foreign Ministers. The second item reported rumours that Stalin was planning to resign his post as the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. Stalin blamed the 'slanderous dispatches' on 6 the loosened censorship of foreign correspondents. 7 He charged that Molotov's eagerness to appease Great Britain and the U.S. sapped his ideological vigilance.
The 'slanderous dispatches' of foreign correspondents proved to Stalin that Molotov erred when he thought that relaxation of censorship would promote a better understanding between the USSR and its former allies. Molotov's 'liberal attitude' undermined Soviet foreign policy and presented the bourgeois press with an opportunity to depict the USSR as weak and prone to concessions. 8 Stalin urged his comrades to understand that uncompromising treatment of foreign correspondents must be part and parcel of the Soviet 'policy of fortitude' vis-à-vis the United States and Great Britain. 9 The new 'policy of fortitude' toward foreign correspondents went into effect in February 1946. It manifested itself first and foremost in the tightening of Soviet censorship. The domestic censoring body -The General Directorate for the Protection of Secrets of the State (Glavlit) -took over the Foreign Ministry's responsibility of censoring foreign correspondents. 10 Under Glavlit the censorship of foreign correspondents was exacerbated and revamped. The censors had the power to alter the journalists' copy however they saw fit. The journalists received no indications as to why certain aspects of their reports, or sometimes the entire journalists' requests to visit sites or to travel outside of Moscow and thus, made it all but impossible to report from anywhere other than the Soviet capital. 15 American correspondents also found increasing difficulties in establishing contact with Soviet citizens and reporting about 'the man on the street.' U.S. embassy personnel and correspondents found that Russians eschewed any contact and regarded the foreigners with suspicion. 16 The new rules brought foreign journalists under the jurisdiction of institutions and practices that developed during the 1930s in response to Soviet anxieties about foreign threat. The Bolsheviks abolished censorship when they came to power, but they reintroduced it in 1922 as a temporary measure to prevent enemies of the revolution from using the press against the new socialist regime. 17 Glavlit began as a modest organisation that was charged with scanning the press for signs of anti-Soviet propaganda and state secrets. 18 During the 1930s, as each wave of purges escalated the fear of foreign enemies and their domestic henchmen, Glavlit acquired new functions and expanded its staff. The Central 15 Foreigners were not allowed to travel by car further than 50 kilometres from Moscow, and even these trips were confined to ten specific roads. A trip outside of the city required an advance notification to the Soviet authorities. "Treatment of U.S. Personnel in the Soviet Union," 26 May 17 Peter Kenez, The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet Methods of Mass Mobilization, 1917 -1929 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985 , 4-14. 18 Zhirkov G.V., Istoriia tsenzury v Rossii XIX-XX vv (Moscow: Aspekt Press, 2001) , online edition, Part II: Evoliutsiia sovetskoii tsenzury: glvalit -kak ee ofitsial 'noe ucherezhdenie (1922-1927 The Cold War reintroduced anxieties about existential threat to the Soviet regime and these anxieties came to shape Soviet policies toward foreign journalists.
The official approach to 'bourgeois correspondents' was influenced by an ideological postulate that mass media could not exist independently of class interests. While the correspondents of communist newspapers were regarded as the friendly voice of international socialism and faced almost no restrictions in their reporting, "bourgeois correspondents" were perceived as the agents of hostile governments, inevitably linked to the ruling elites of their countries and seeking to undermine the Soviet Union like their capitalist masters. The restrictions on foreign journalists, especially censorship, attempted to minimise the damage that these 'enemy agents' could cause and to regulate the production of the Soviet image overseas.
American Journalist -a Hero of the anti-American Campaign
The new regulations on foreign correspondents failed to help the Soviet image abroad; in fact, the regulations made this image even worse. Throughout 1946, the dossiers of foreign press reports about the USSR grew thicker and their contents more acrimonious. American and British news media accused the Soviet Union of war mongering and of obstructing foreign correspondents in their efforts to report the truth about the USSR. In retaliation, the Soviet press launched a publicity campaign against 'bourgeois journalists,' especially those from the United States. The campaign facilitated a broader shift in postwar rhetoric and explicitly identified the American press with the worst excesses of capitalist mass media.
For example, the June 1947 issue of the popular satirical journal Krokodil featured a comic strip entitled, 'Illustrations to the notes of a foreign correspondent's visit to Moscow.' The comic chronicled a 'bourgeois' correspondent's travel throughout the USSR and derided his falsifying comments about his Soviet experience. While visiting a beach the journalist is seen scribbling in his notebook: 'I had an opportunity to observe that the people surrounding me had no clothes to wear.' 20 In the following months and years anti-American cartoons and derision of the 'bourgeois press' became more prominent and more sinister. 21 Krokodil depicted the 'bourgeois press' as ugly men, spiders, or snakes who were seen labouring to construct lies about the Soviet Union. From 20 Krokodil, 20 June 1947, p. 10. 21 In 1945, Krokodil carried three cartoons targeting the American press (July 6, September 10 and December 30). In 1946, three cartoons attacked the press (20 August, 10 September, 30 September).
In 1947 six cartoons were dedicated to the American press. 11 1947 these images were reinforced in Pravda articles dedicated to 'warmongering bourgeois press' and its 'service to capitalist bosses.' 22 Other cultural products, especially theatre and film shared this preoccupation with 'capitalist press'. The most famous of these was Konstantin Simonov's play The Russian Question. The play was published in 1947 and received the prestigious Stalin Prize in Literature and the Arts. It centred around the American press, capitalist sponsorship of anti-Soviet propaganda, and a politically conscious journalist who seeks the truth. The protagonist of the play is an American journalist Harry Smith, whose capitalist bosses send him to the USSR, expecting a negative publication upon his return. Smith defies his bosses and sets out to write a book that will tell Americans that they have been misled about the Soviet Union, which is really a wonderful place. The media magnates are incensed; Smith loses his job, his girlfriend, and his house, but he sticks to his story. Stalin personally endorsed the play and instructed that it be widely publicised. 23 Second World War differed in their opinions, writing styles, and approaches to certain themes and topics. Nevertheless, they shared in the collectivist ethos of a mobilised press, which sought to carry the voice of the state and help the state in its project of educating the masses. In the Soviet eyes, American correspondents personified the mighty weapon of written words in the wrong hands. As writers, they had attained superior levels of political consciousness; nevertheless, they knowingly put themselves in the service of 'reaction' and in opposition to the historical progress. Herein lay the threat of American journalists and their prominent place in Soviet anxieties about losing the propaganda war: conscious and willing, they were some of the deadliest weapons of enemy ideology.
As the campaign against American journalists escalated in the Soviet Union, American publishers and government officials interpreted Soviet limitations on foreign correspondents as calculated attempts to manipulate international public opinion and to help Communist propaganda infiltrate the United States. 40 Current and former Moscow correspondents supported this interpretation. 41 When State Department officials learned that it was impossible to resolve the censorship issue through diplomatic channels, they suggested that the publishers attach an indication 'passed through censor' to every news item with a Moscow byline. 42 However, the Associated Press and the New York Times -both major players in the Moscow press corps -resisted these proposals. The AP Board President Robert intervention, precluded the establishment of any organisation that would resemble the Soviet Glavlit. 44 The campaign against Soviet journalists in the United States developed on several parallel fronts; it often involved grassroots initiatives, and brought together government agencies, elected officials, journalists, businessmen and anti- 
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In the absence of tighter government regulations, individual officials began to take matters into their own hands. In 1948, Aleksander Aleksandrov, TASS bureau chief in New York, reported to the agency's directors in Moscow that several government ministries refused to supply TASS with standard reports that previously had been in the public domain and available to the press. In each case, Aleksandrov appealed to the press secretary of the ministry in question but usually to no avail. After querying colleagues from other foreign news services, Aleksandrov learned that TASS was the only agency that could no longer receive the reports. 55 Another, and more significant, case of official discrimination occurred in 1950 when TASS was the only foreign news service barred from the Pentagon's press briefings on the Korean War. Even though on that occasion the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued an official statement of objection, the Department of Defence ignored it and continued to bar TASS from its press conferences. 56 Although TASS offices in the U.S. seldom made headlines, the agency's employees felt that the American press missed 'no opportunity to pin-prick us in its reports.' 57 Media coverage usually questioned the nature of the agency's ties to the Soviet government and explored the isolation and the demeanour of TASS correspondents. 58 Occasionally, pundits suggested that the U.S. should retaliate against the Soviet treatment of American correspondents and impose an equally strict set of limitations on TASS. 59 In January 1951, The Saturday Evening Post ran the longest, most acerbic feature about TASS to date. Titled 'Stalin's American Snoops,' the article reiterated the assertion that TASS was 'in no sense an honest news agency' but a combined Soviet propaganda service and intelligence operation. 60 The author, Paul Healey, was particularly interested in TASS's American employees and explored how the pathology of dissent led these sons and daughters of good American families to betray their country and work for the Soviets. In conclusion, Healey argued that the U.S. government should demand from Soviet leaders 'a quid pro quo' in access to information and press coverage and that 'many Washington officials' feel the same way. 61 The basic premise of the article -that TASS was not a real news agency -repeated ideas that had been floating in the American press since 1946. However, the feature introduced several new aspects to anti-TASS rhetoric. First, the article cited U.S. Congressmen and senior officials and thus conveyed the impression that the establishment shared ealey's view that TASS was engaged in suspicious activities. Second, the piece explicitly labeled TASS's American employees as traitors and Soviet henchmen, an accusation that could have had serious social and legal repercussions in the context of the Red Scare.
Ivan Beglov, the new bureau chief in New York, was convinced that the article in the Saturday Evening Post inspired several American firms to take independent action against TASS. Beglov sent a distressed letter to Moscow and reported that after the article appeared, several private companies refused to honour their contracts with TASS and declined the agency's requests to subscribe to their publications. 62 It came as a surprise to us that the Soviet Union is still able to make purchases in this country. We do not often have an opportunity to take direct action in International affairs. In our own small way we feel that one of the greatest contributions we can make at this time is a firm refusal to sell or even quote to a country, which has been responsible for so much bloodshed. We can only hope that our action could be endorsed by all business concerns the world over. However, even those who warned that the ban on TASS could endanger the freedom of the press shared the view that TASS was not a real news agency.
Expressions of concern about the ban were articulated mostly in terms of potential 81 Ibid., p. 10. 82 Ibid., p. 7.
83 "Tass Men as Spies," Washington Post, 7 September 1951. impact that the ban could have on American news media and did not suggest that TASS was entitled to enjoy the same freedoms. 85 All eyes were on the State and Justice Departments and their verdict as to whether TASS should be considered a bona fide news agency. Both ministries conducted themselves with extreme caution and did not rush to weigh in on the matter. The Attorney General explained that, for reasons of confidentiality, the Justice Department could not reveal any information it had on TASS beyond the fact that it was registered as an agent of foreign government. Assistant State Secretary Jack K. McFall said that representatives of the press should be the ones to determine TASS's access to the Congressional galleries. Behind the scenes, State Department officials shared the popular conviction that 'TASS as a whole was not a news agency' and said as much to the agency's American employees. 86 However, the same officials thought that banning TASS would jeopardise American correspondents and other U.S. interests across the Iron Curtain and will fail to help Oatis. 87 On September 21, 1951, the Standing Committee of Congressional Correspondents announced that it had decided against barring Fedorov or other TASS journalists from Congressional galleries. The resolution stated that 'the principles of a free press cannot be upheld by abridging them' and explained that the Committee did not wish to exceed its mandate and 'move into the field of 85 "Editors (28 to 12) Endorse Barring Tass from Gallery," Editor and Publisher, 15 September 1951, pp. 10-11. 86 Beglov to Pal'gunov, 12 September 1951. GARF, f. R-4459, op. 38, d. 309, ll. 75-76. 87 Memorandum on "Communist Correspondents in the U. S.," 30 July 1951 , Box 7: Soviet Correspondents, 1951 -1960 Special Collection Subject Files, 1950 -1982 Relations. It is not a coincidence that ASNE, the AP, and Editor and Publisher led the attacks. American publishers opposed government regulation of the press as strongly as they opposed communism, for both targeted the core of their interests: free flow of information and free markets. 91 American news media embraced and took a great pride in the notion that it was their duty to educate the public about the world around them, to provide information that was essential for informed participation in government, and to protect the citizens and their freedoms from the powers that be. 92 Nothing could pose a starker contradiction to these vaunted principles than TASS, a news agency that functioned as the official voice of the Soviet government and remained closely linked to its policies. 88 "Newsmen bulk at move to ban red reporters," Chicago Daily Tribune, 21 September 1951;  Just as the campaign against TASS emphasised the American commitment to liberal ideals of separation between the press and the government, these ideals were changing and adapting to new realities of the national security state. After 1945 most American publishers aligned themselves with the government's antiCommunist agenda and supported America's standoff with the Soviet Union. 93 However, the Cold War introduced new tensions into this relationship as government officials began to stress the importance of secrecy in protection of national security and erected new barriers to the news media's access to information. 94 The publishers vehemently resisted these policies, which they criticised as detrimental to American democracy and freedom of speech. 95 The attacks on TASS provided publishers, journalists, and government officials with a platform where they could reiterate their commitment to the rights of the press while glossing over the contested and the changing meaning of these rights. In this increasingly complicated relationship between the government and the press, the consensus that Soviet state control undermined TASS's credibility as a news agency gained a symbolic significance.
The campaign against TASS took a heavy toll on its correspondents. New York bureau chief Ivan Beglov reported to his bosses in Moscow that American employees found it particularly difficult to cope: 'The systematic hunt of TASS in
bourgeoisie press and open invasion of our New York and Washington offices by 93 David Halberstam, The Powers that Be, (New York: Knopf, 1979) Soviet leaders and TASS bosses in Moscow closely followed the campaign, but despite Beglov's pleas, they decided to take no action. TASS director Nikolai Pal'gunov explained to Beglov that the campaign against the agency was the logical outcome of American capitalists' fear of Soviet journalists and urged his people to preserve the ideological rigour of their reporting:
Explain to the comrades that we could expect similar, and perhaps, even more venomous and vicious attacks of American reactionary circles on TASS workers.
Impress upon the Soviet comrades that we must retain complete self-control, must keep working as if nothing is happening, not to be afraid, and continue to attend press conferences, the Congress, and other places where they usually go.
96 Beglov to Pal'gunov, 9 November 1951. GARF, f. R-4459, op. 38, d. 309, l. 90. 97 Ibid. At the same time, particularly impress upon them that they must not allow others to provoke them for irresponsible words and actions and must not provide [the American press with reasons for] provocative opinions.
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Pal'gunov made sense of the attacks on TASS through the prism of Soviet ideology. He was convinced that American 'reactionaries' attacked TASS because they were ordered to do so by the capitalist magnates, who controlled the press. Pal'gunov urged his people to carry on the duties of socialist journalists, a main part of which was the unmasking of the capitalist world order. Unlike many United States. 103 According to the Times, all the information that TASS sent to Moscow was already available in American newspapers, and making this information accessible to the public was a calculated risk that the U.S. ran as a free country. 104 At least on the surface, the profile in the New York Times drew the line under question of TASS. Pundits and government officials agreed that the agency served as a direct wire to the Kremlin, but they continued to accept TASS's presence in the US as a tolerable evil.
Conclusion:
Comparative The American liberal ideal also stressed the educational role of mass media.
However, the instructive potential of the American press sprang from a radically different premise. Soviet mass media fulfilled its educational role only in close collaboration with the state. By contrast, the educational capacity of the American press resided in its mandate to stand up to the powers that be and monitor their 40 actions. The principle of separation between the press and the government was central to the liberal ideology of American news media and to the campaign against TASS. The attacks on TASS had no coordinating structure and proceeded on several parallel fronts. In the process, pundits' and publishers' demands to take a hard line toward TASS often clashed with the agenda of government officials and their concern for American interests overseas. However, media professionals and the government agreed that TASS's relationship with the Soviet state rendered it illegitimate as a news service. Soviet correspondents were perceived as dangerous not because they were journalists, but because they were governmentcontrolled journalists, and therefore were expected to advance the interests of foreign power.
In the American campaign against TASS, ideology operated covertly. The participants in the campaign were not conscious of the ideological underpinnings of their actions. Convinced that the only way to report the news was the one practiced by the American liberal news media, they charged that Soviet-style reporting was not journalism at all. Although several leading voices in the journalistic profession did not support harsh measures against TASS, they shared the idea that it should not be considered a real news agency. The campaign against TASS thus naturalised the liberal ideology of news. At the same time, the campaign obscured the fissures in the journalistic profession and the disagreements between the press and the government over the rights and duties of the press vis-à-vis the national security state.
Approaching the campaigns against enemy correspondents from a comparative perspective reveals that the attacks on journalists were not only symptoms of Cold War propaganda or the new information policies that each superpower adopted as a result of the growing suspicion of the other. Observers on both sides regarded enemy correspondents with suspicion because of the broader symbolic meaning that journalism had in Soviet socialist and American liberal ideology. In the Soviet Union, journalism symbolised the hope in propaganda as a vehicle of enlightenment, which would help the New Men and Women of the socialist society to develop their proletarian consciousness and transform themselves into historical actors and builders of socialism. In the United States, journalism represented the foundational principles of American democracy: the freedom to express one's opinion, informed participation in the democratic process and the accountability of office holders to their electorate. These idealised notions of journalism remained unattainable in reality and were subjected to internal debates by practitioners who had their own prejudices. However, the ideal itself was never rejected on either side and lived on as a powerful symbol of Soviet socialist and American liberal capitalist modernity. As the respective campaigns against enemy correspondents unfolded, journalism became a symbol of the quintessential distinction between socialism and capitalism or liberalism and totalitarianism.
